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ABSTRACT
Paid crowdsourcing platforms suffer from low-quality work
and unfair rejections, but paradoxically, most workers and
requesters have high reputation scores. These inflated scores,
which make high-quality work and workers difficult to find,
stem from social pressure to avoid giving negative feedback.
We introduce Boomerang, a reputation system for crowdsourc-
ing that elicits more accurate feedback by rebounding the
consequences of feedback directly back onto the person who
gave it. With Boomerang, requesters find that their highly-
rated workers gain earliest access to their future tasks, and
workers find tasks from their highly-rated requesters at the top
of their task feed. Field experiments verify that Boomerang
causes both workers and requesters to provide feedback that is
more closely aligned with their private opinions. Inspired by a
game-theoretic notion of incentive-compatibility, Boomerang
opens opportunities for interaction design to incentivize honest
reporting over strategic dishonesty.
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INTRODUCTION
Today’s crowdsourcing platforms are markets for lemons [4,
22]. On crowdsourcing platforms such as Amazon Mechanical
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Figure 1. Boomerang is a reputation system that rebounds the con-
sequences of ratings back onto the people who gave them. With
Boomerang, requesters’ ratings determine which workers get early ac-
cess to their tasks, and workers’ ratings determine the ranking of their
task feed. Boomerang produces an incentive to rate accurately: falsely
inflating a ranking will lead to a poorer experience.
Turk and Upwork, both workers and requesters face signif-
icant uncertainty: workers struggle to predict whether a re-
quester will pay for their work [33, 24], and requesters worry
whether workers will produce high-quality results [29, 34].
To reduce this uncertainty, crowdsourcing platforms rely on
reputation systems such as task acceptance rates for work-
ers and star ratings for requesters [24]. However, reputation
systems are unable to address this uncertainty: for example,
workers’ acceptance rates on Mechanical Turk are often above
97%, regardless of the quality of their work [36]. The result
is a downward spiral [4]: requesters offer lower wages to
offset their risk of low-quality results, and workers respond
to lower payment with lower quality work [22, 7, 49]. Ulti-
mately, ineffective reputation systems lead to dissatisfaction,
lost productivity, and abandonment.
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Figure 2. Daemo’s task feed shows a list of tasks from which workers can select. Boomerang places requesters whom the worker has rated highly (X+)
at the top, and those whom the worker has rated poorly (X-) at the bottom.
Reliable reputation information does exist—workers and re-
questers form detailed opinions about each other as they
interact—but this information is difficult to elicit accurately.
The core challenge is reputation inflation: significant social
costs to providing negative feedback cause people to “gener-
ously round up” their feedback scores, even if they hope to
never work with that partner again [21, 23, 49]. Incentives are
misaligned: for example, by the time a worker realizes that a re-
quester is low-quality, the worker is already mid-way through
the task and has little reason to report the issue accurately.
For their part, many requesters never reject work—even terri-
ble work—because they do not want to deal with the resulting
complaints [38]. Algorithms can derive reputation information
post-hoc by comparing workers’ responses to each other [48]
and to ground truth [6], but tasks that are open-ended cannot
utilize these techniques. As a result, workers and requesters
often regress to manual curation of trusted partners [36, 2].
If accurate reputation information is desired [31], no current
design elicits it.
In this paper, we draw on incentive compatibility [39, 28] as an
interaction design strategy to capture more accurate reputation
feedback for crowdsourcing systems. Incentive compatibility,
in economic game theory, requires a set of rules in which
people maximize their own outcomes by sharing their private
information truthfully. As a result, incentive compatibility has
traditionally been applied to economic environments where it
is possible to influence people’s behaviors under a formal set
of rules and expected monetary payoffs [27] such as crowd-
sourcing payment schemes [51, 50]. In this paper, we explore
whether the core ideas behind incentive compatibility can ap-
ply more broadly to the wicked [45] socio-technical design of a
crowdsourcing system. We pursue incentive compatible inter-
action design by introducing designs in which people benefit
the most from the system when they truthfully rate and share
honest opinions of their partners. In contrast to traditional rep-
utation systems, which allow people to leave feedback with no
impact on themselves, an incentive-compatible design might
find a way to rebound the consequences of inaccurate feedback
back onto the person who gave it.
We draw on incentive-compatible interaction design strategies
to introduce Boomerang, a reputation system for crowdsourc-
ing marketplaces. In order to align workers’ and requesters’ in-
centives when leaving reputation feedback, Boomerang takes
users’ feedback and then “boomerangs” it back so that their
feedback impacts their activities later in the platform, such
that inaccurate reporting results in a lower-quality experience
and accurate reporting results in a higher-quality experience
for requesters and workers:
1. Rating: When a requester posts a new task, Boomerang
grants early access to workers whom the requester rated
highly in the past (Figure 1). Thus, inflating the rating
of a low-quality worker increases the probability that the
low-quality worker will complete that requester’s future
tasks before others can, reducing the quality of future work
results. Similarly, Boomerang ranks workers’ task feeds
using their ratings, making it easier to find requesters who
they have rated highly (Figure 2).
2. Rejection: Boomerang displays a personalized estimate
of each requester’s rejection rate to workers in the task
feed. For example, a high-rated worker sees a requester’s
rejection rate for other high-rated workers, while a low-rated
worker sees that requester’s rejection rate for other low-rated
workers. Aware that workers will avoid requesters with high
rejection rates, requesters become incentivized to avoid
attracting low-quality workers by never rejecting work, or
repelling high-quality workers by frequently rejecting work.
We evaluate Boomerang through a series of field experiments.
The first set of experiments provide evidence that Boomerang
causes workers and requesters to provide rating feedback that
is more closely aligned with their private opinions. The second
set of experiments demonstrate that workers react to the visi-
bility of rejection information, and knowing this, requesters
become more accurate at accepting and rejecting submissions.
So far, we have implemented Boomerang by integrating it
with the Daemo crowdsourcing platform [16]. However,
Boomerang introduces the opportunity to explore incentive-
compatible interaction design on crowdsourcing platforms,
and on socio-technical platforms more broadly, by encourag-
ing contributors to share privately-held information accurately
and effectively. If successful, incentive-compatible interaction
design could help these platforms build stronger foundations
of trust and more effective contribution models.
RELATED WORK
Boomerang draws on research on crowdsourcing marketplaces
as well as literature on mechanism design and incentive com-
patibility.
Unreliable signals on crowdsourcing platforms
Paid crowdsourcing platforms frame an ideal of connecting
requesters with distributed human intelligence, while provid-
ing workers with opportunities to supplement their income,
enhance their skills, and find longer-term career opportuni-
ties [31]. In pursuit of this, platforms have attracted a large
set of diverse workers (e.g., [17, 37]). Prior research has
focused on recruiting and guiding crowd work through new
channels such as local communities [19], experts [44], short
bursts of free time [54], workflows inspired by distributed
computing [30].
However, paid crowdsourcing platforms still struggle to ensure
high-quality results for requesters and fair payment for work-
ers, threatening the stability of these socio-technical ecosys-
tems [31, 33, 46, 9]. While many issues are at fault, two
in particular are a result of unreliable information shared on
the platform: a) inflated reputation scores, which make it
difficult to anticipate whether a worker or requester is truly
high-quality [21, 31], and b) unpredictable requester rejec-
tion behavior, which creates uncertainty around task accep-
tance [31, 33]. These challenges lead to downstream issues
with requester activities such as pricing tasks [12, 11] and
determining worker accuracy [48].
This paper argues that one source of these challenges is the
misaligned incentives between requesters and workers. For
example, in Amazon Mechanical Turk’s reputation system,
workers are filtered based on their acceptance rates and prior
task performance [36], but the requesters who assign these
scores rarely have a future stake in those workers’ reputation
being accurate. Due to this misalignment, reputation infor-
mation on crowdsourcing platforms is often an externality,
meaning that those who benefit or suffer are different from
those who engage in the behavior [10]. Boomerang aims to
address these problems by causing users to internalize the
downstream effects of their behaviors via the design of the rep-
utation and rejection mechanisms of crowdsourcing platforms.
Rating and rejection
Whether through acceptance rates (e.g., Amazon Mechanical
Turk) or star ratings (e.g., Upwork), online reputation [42] is
the main filter used by both workers [24] and requesters [14,
34] on crowdsourcing platforms. However, designing a crowd-
sourcing reputation system to elicit fair and accurate ratings
remains a challenge. Public feedback is highly inflated: there
is social pressure to rate highly so that workers and requesters
can continue to be competitive in the marketplace, and to
avoid any possibility of retaliation [3, 21]. Private feedback
can mitigate this problem [53, 21], but does not erase it. This
challenge motivates our design of a system that incentivizes
workers and requesters to tell the truth about the quality of
their partners.
Creating psychological nudges, payment structures, and game-
theoretical incentives can help encourage high-quality crowd
work [28, 47, 32, 56]. However, these incentives do not recip-
rocally apply to requesters’ rejection behavior: requesters still
hold immense power to deny payment for finished tasks [33].
To address this challenge, we designed Boomerang’s rejection
strategy to influence requesters to reject and accept tasks more
fairly.
Incentives and truth-telling
Boomerang draws heavily on the concept of incentive com-
patibility as a motivation for its design. Incentive compat-
ibility, a game-theoretical stance in which behaving truth-
fully is the best possible (or dominant) strategy, plays a vital
role in defining people’s empirical truth-telling behavior [39,
40]. Market-oriented computing research such as advertising
auctions make liberal use of the concept, for example with
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions [39], which are one
of the most popular auctions in use today [15, 1]. Similarly,
single item second-price auctions are won by the top-bidding
agent, but that agent pays the amount of the second-highest
bid. This mechanism incentivizes agents to bid honestly, rather
than inflating or lowballing their bid. They achieve the best
outcome for themselves by bidding honestly regardless of an-
other’s actions [39]. Inspired by this work, we designed an
incentive structure that motivates workers and requesters to
share private information about the quality of their partners.
BOOMERANG
In this section, we explore incentive-compatible interaction
design through Boomerang (Figure 1), a reputation system
for crowdsourcing platforms that incentivizes users to rate
honestly and to provide their privately-held information ac-
curately. We begin this section by introducing our goal of
incentive-compatible interaction design. Following this in-
troduction, we present Boomerang’s two components: rating
feedback and rejection transparency.
Because Boomerang requires significant infrastructural
changes to existing closed-source crowdsourcing platforms,
we have implemented it as part of the open-source Daemo
platform [16]. Daemo includes worker task feed and task
completion interfaces, requester project authoring and result
review interfaces, and other basic features of a paid crowd-
sourcing platform. On Daemo, tasks are the basic unit of work,
and a series of tasks are grouped into a single unit called a
project. Daemo cross-posts projects to Amazon Mechanical
Turk when workers are unavailable.
Incentive-compatibility in interaction design
Crowdsourcing is no stranger to game-theoretic analyses
(e.g. [41, 50].) This prior research takes place in scenarios
where agents are rational and self-interested—meaning they
are trying to maximize only their own outcomes, such as earn-
ings for a worker or result quality for a requester. To influence
agents’ decisions, the system designers create a mechanism,
or a set of rules and payoffs. Because agents are rational, they
may act strategically or lie if the mechanism makes it advan-
tageous for them to do so. For a mechanism to be incentive-
compatible, acting truthfully must lead to the best outcome for
every agent [39]. VCG auctions are one well-known incentive-
compatible mechanism: designers create a system whereby
agents have no incentive to deviate from a truth-telling strategy,
hence preventing the system from collapsing under antisocial
strategic behavior.
Boomerang seeks a design for wicked socio-technical prob-
lems [45]—in which agents do not share a clearly-definable
strategy and the set of possible behaviors are unknown—such
as those seen on crowdsourcing platforms. In crowdsourc-
ing, even money is insufficient as a sole incentive: money
is important, but it is not a total determinant of behavior [5,
35]. However, the designer has a wide variety of interaction
designs that they might utilize. We thus generalize from the
precise game-theoretic definition of incentive compatibility to
pursue incentive-compatible interaction design, in which the
designer influences users to share honest information with the
system.
We seek socio-technical designs where the user benefits more
by sharing honest information with the platform than by shar-
ing inaccurate information. The interaction design must result
in a significantly less useful system if a user acts dishonestly or
manipulatively. In this light, designs such as collaborative rec-
ommender systems [43] and the ESP Game [55, 32] aim to be
incentive compatible, because strategic or dishonest behavior
will only lead to worse recommendations or lower scores for
the user [25]. Other designs, such as dating sites [18] and the
UC San Diego DARPA Shredder Challenge team [52], repre-
sent non-incentive compatible systems, because a contributor
can share information dishonestly or strategically with no cost
to themselves. Similar to crowdsourcing reputation systems,
these systems must instead assume a norm of honest behavior.
And like the Shredder Challenge, crowdsourcing marketplaces
have witnessed this shared assumption broken and difficult to
repair.
The following two designs represent our exploration into
incentive-compatible interaction design for crowdsourcing. To
begin, we rebound the consequences of inaccurate reputation
ratings back onto the person who made them.
Rating feedback
In bilateral rating systems, such as those on crowdsourcing
platforms where workers and requesters rate each other, there
is significant social pressure to inflate ratings and “generously
round up” in order to avoid retaliation, acquiesce to complaints,
or enable someone continue to work on the platform [21].
In such situations, the strategic decision for workers and re-
questers is to rate their counterpart higher than they might
privately believe. This strategic behavior inflates the overall
ratings on the platform and leads to uncertainty about each
person’s true quality.
As workers submit work on Daemo, or after they receive feed-
back, they have the option to rate requesters on a 3-point
scale.1 These ratings correspond to X- (below expectations),
X (meets expectations), and X+ (exceeds expectations). Like-
wise, when requesters review workers’ submissions, they may
rate the workers. This is a holistic rating system where re-
questers may, for example, be assigned one rating that ac-
counts for task clarity, fair payment, and communication.
In Boomerang, ratings are designed to directly affect work-
ers’ and requesters’ future work partners. The ratings that
a requester gives to workers determine which workers will
gain early access to the requester’s future tasks. Likewise,
the ratings that a worker gives to requesters determines the
ranking of tasks in their task feed, with tasks from high-rated
requesters at the top and those from low-rated requesters at
the bottom. Each effect is intended to counter social pressure
by introducing an individual incentive: requesters want higher
quality work, and workers want to quickly find higher qual-
ity requesters [13]. If the individual incentive is sufficiently
strong, each user will truthfully share their private information
about the quality of their counterparts. Below, we describe the
design in detail.
Requesters’ incentive: workers’ access to tasks
On current platforms, requesters typically have little incentive
to rate workers accurately (if at all), in part because those rat-
ings have no bearing on their future result quality. Boomerang
uses the ratings that a requester gives a worker to determine
when that worker receives access to the requester’s future
tasks. This change gives requesters an incentive to rate work-
ers accurately, because rating a worker a X+ gives the worker
early access to that requester’s future tasks and rating a worker
a X- gives the worker late access to that requester’s future
tasks (Figure 3). In other words, inflating a ranking so that a
poor worker gets a X or X+ will greatly increase the odds that
this worker will “boomerang” and return to do more of that
requester’s tasks, indirectly penalizing the requester.
After a requester posts a new project, the workers who they
had previously rated a X+ will immediately gain access. If the
project remains on the marketplace and only a fewX+ workers
are accepting it, then the task becomes available to workers
with a X rating from that requester, and eventually to workers
with aX-. If a requester has not explicitly rated a given worker,
then Boomerang uses that worker’s global average rating from
all requesters. Within these X+, X, X- groups, we create finer
granularity in the cascade by using workers’ global average
rating as a secondary sort as we release tasks.
This cascaded release of tasks only triggers the next group
of lower-rated workers if the current group of higher-rated
workers is not accepting the task and completing it rapidly
(Figure 3). To implement this cascaded release, Boomerang
measures the current task completion rate using a sliding win-
dow and compares the current rate to the maximum completion
rate observed with the current minimum rating level. When
the current rate is a small enough percentage of the maximum
rate, utilization is low and Boomerang reduces the minimum
1Multidimensional or five-point rating systems would function simi-
larly. We began with a traditional 5-point rating system [24], but feed-
back from workers indicated that a 3-point model of bury/keep/love
would be clearer.
Figure 3. Boomerang cascades task release to X+ workers first. When
their completion rate slows, it opens the task to X workers, then finally
X- workers.
rating and resets its maximum. Intuitively: task completion
rates spike immediately following a release to a set of new
workers, then tapers off. When the rate is low relative to its
initial spike, indicating that workers have tried and abandoned
the task, Boomerang releases to additional workers. If the
rate remains high after the initial spike, this indicates high
utilization—that workers are continuing to engage with the
task.
Internally, Boomerang represents a X- as a score of 1, X as 2,
and X+ as 3. All projects have a minimum rating threshold,
representing which worker group can access the projects’ tasks.
New projects are initialized with a minimum score of 3. The
minimum rating threshold is measured with a sliding window
period of T . Where t is the current time, tinit is the time that
Boomerang last reduced the minimum score threshold, and
CompletedTasks(start,end) is the number of completed tasks
between start and end, the system measures utilization as the
ratio of tasks completed:
utilization =
CompletedTasks(t−T, t)
max
ti∈[tinit , t−T ]
CompletedTasks(ti, ti+T )
If utilization ≤ λ for a utilization ratio λ (e.g., 0.3), the
Boomerang threshold is reduced to the maximum average
rating smaller than the previous threshold value among the
workers who have worked for this requester.
All new Daemo users are seeded with a score just below sev-
eral X ratings (1.99, where a X scores a 2), which anchors
their score with a near-2 “prior” so that initial negative ratings
do not lock them out of the platform or discourage them from
accepting more tasks. To allow workers and requesters to
recover from mistakes and inaccurate ratings, we use exponen-
tial weighting to calculate each person’s rating. Exponential
weighting ensures that ratings reflect workers’ recent perfor-
mances and account for quality improvements or declines.
Workers’ incentive: task feed ranking
We considered many possible worker incentives, for exam-
ple amplifying payment rates for tasks that a worker rates
highly, or betting earnings on whether others would also rate
a requester highly. However, in our continuous participatory
design efforts with workers, it was clear that finding new tasks
quickly was a major need that was not well-served by the
existing requester-notification tools. Workers spend much of
their time searching through thousands of tasks in the task
feed and on online forums to identify high-quality, fair-paying
work [13, 33, 24]. Boomerang capitalizes on this need to find
tasks by ranking the task feed so that tasks from requesters
that a worker gave a high rating are at the top, and requesters
receiving low rating are buried at the bottom. Rating good re-
questers X+ and bad requesters X- makes it easier for workers
to find tasks they want to do in the future.
As a worker rates requesters, Boomerang determines the
ranking of their task feed (Figure 2) as follows. We first form
groups of requesters: the requesters that this worker rated X+
(internal score: 3), those rated X (2), those rated X- (1), and
those brand new to the platform (initialized just below 2). The
task feed is then ordered by rating group, with ties broken
with each requester’s average rating from other workers on the
platform. A requester whom a worker rated X+ and all other
workers also rated a X+ will appear above a requester whom a
worker rated a X+ and other workers rated a X on average.
For requesters whom the worker has not yet rated, we use that
requester’s average rating from other workers as a proxy.
Rejection transparency
Our fieldwork with workers and requesters, as well as prior
work [33], indicated three common task rejection patterns for
requesters: (1) those who accept all work that they receive;
(2) those who reject fairly, i.e. when the submission is clearly
inappropriate; and (3) those who reject unfairly, i.e. even
when the work demonstrated clear effort and skill. Requesters
in group (1) are easily exploited and lead to an equilibrium
in which workers submit low-quality work without fear of
rejection. Requesters in (3) take advantage of workers and
disenfranchise honest, hard-working individuals.
Requesters hold the power to deny payment without worker
contestation on platforms such as Amazon Mechanical Turk.
As a result, a worker’s decision to select a task is substantially
impacted by the likelihood of rejection. For example, Martin
et al. report a worker post on TurkerNation [33]: “Got a
mass rejection from some hits I did for them! Talked to other
turkers that I know in real life and the same thing happened
to them. There rejection comments are also really demeaning.
Definitely avoid!”
Boomerang helps address this issue by displaying each re-
quester’s rejection rates on the task feed for tasks submitted by
workers like the current user (Figure 4). Workers can then use
this estimate of their own rejection rate as an aid in the task se-
lection process. In other words, a low-rated worker would see
the requester’s rejection rate for tasks from low-rated workers,
and a high-rated worker would see the requester’s rejection
rate for tasks from high-rated workers. Boomerang does not
display a single rejection rate for the requester, because it
is too distanced from each worker’s experience to sway the
worker’s behavior, and would allow a requester to unfairly
reject a few high-quality workers and accept many low-quality
workers just to maintain an acceptable rate and not accept and
reject for legitimate reasons.
Requesters who are aware that their rejection rate will be
visible have an incentive to rate accurately. If they blindly
accept all work from workers in a given rating category (X-,
Figure 4. Workers see a personalized rejection rate for every requester
on their task feed. By leniently or frequently rejecting work of various
qualities, a requester influences whether low- or high-quality workers
will complete their tasks. Requesters hope to avoid strategic workers
from accepting their tasks if they are too lenient or avoiding their tasks
if they are too harsh.
X, or X+), they may attract workers who are strategically
seeking tasks that are unlikely to get rejected even if they are
less accurate than usual. However, if the requester begins
rejecting too much work, workers will avoid taking the task
unless they are willing to risk getting a lemon [4].
To calculate a requester’s rejection rate for a worker to view,
we partition the range of reputation scores (1–3) into six equal
buckets and select the bucket that contains the worker’s rating.
We calculate a weighted average of the percentage of that
worker’s submissions that the requester has rejected and the
percentage of work that the requester has rejected submitted by
everyone else in the worker’s bucket. We favor the individual
worker while computing this weighted rejection rate. If the
worker has not completed any work for the requester, we use
only the rejection rate of workers in their bucket as a proxy
for their rejection rate. And if the requester has not rejected
any tasks yet, we use the rejection rate of the worker’s bucket
by requesters with similar reputation.
EVALUATION
This paper draws on incentive compatibility to inspire de-
signs for more honest reporting on crowdsourcing platforms.
Traditionally, evaluating incentive-compatible mechanisms
requires an economic game with rules that can be modeled
via a payoff function, and requires a mathematical proof that
either 1) deviating from honest reporting is never better and
sometimes strictly worse than telling the truth no matter what
others do (strategyproofness), or 2) if everyone else reports
honestly, it is optimal for the agent to also report honestly (a
Nash equilibrium) [39]. However, our goal is to engage not
in formal mechanism design, but in the wicked problem of
socio-technical interaction design, which operates at a level of
complexity and scale where it is impossible to fully model ev-
eryone’s behavior or payoffs [45]. With this wicked problem,
the outcome of these interventions depends on how strongly
each incentive will motivate each user. So, in our evaluations,
we opt for a behavioral outcome via a field experiment in-
stead of a theoretical guarantee. This allows us to measure the
empirical strength of each design intervention.
We performed two studies: the first tested the Boomerang rep-
utation feedback design, and the second tested the Boomerang
task rejection design. Each of these studies was performed
twice, once for requesters and once for workers.
Study 1: Reputation feedback
Our first study examined whether the Boomerang reputation
system produced more honest feedback from requesters and
workers.
Requesters: Method
We conducted a between-subjects field experiment to test the
effectiveness of Boomerang in incentivizing requesters to pro-
vide more accurate ratings of workers. To do so, we compared
requesters’ rating feedback to a forced-choice evaluation of
each worker’s quality.
We recruited 35 requesters who had experience on a microtask
crowdsourcing platform and randomized them between the
Boomerang and control conditions. The population included
professionals and academic requesters, with a skew toward
academics. The requesters performed a first phase of rating,
then a second phase of forced-choice decisions.
For their rating phase, requesters were shown a series of three
representative yet difficult microtasks in sequence: video sum-
marization, fact extraction from a webpage, and webpage
viewpoint classification. Prior to the study, we pre-populated
the results by recruiting 21 workers from Amazon Mechanical
Turk to complete every task. We recruited these workers with
a variety of different HIT completion and acceptance require-
ments to ensure a distribution of worker quality. However,
requesters did not see all 21 workers’ results for every task:
for each task, we sampled seven workers and showed only
their results to the requester, reserving the other workers as
“the crowd” that Boomerang might allow or prevent from tak-
ing future tasks based on the feedback. Requesters saw results
from each task one at a time and were asked to rate workers
based on the quality of their results.
Requesters in the control condition saw a traditional rating
interface: “I like this”, “Default”, and “I don’t like this”. These
responses did not impact which workers performed upcoming
tasks. In the Boomerang condition, the interface stated: “Like:
Grant this worker early access to my tasks, so they do a lot of
my work”, “Same: Give this worker access at the same time
as normal workers, so they do a bit of my work”, and “Bury:
prevent this worker from getting access to my tasks until last,
so they rarely do my work”. In both conditions, the seven
workers (out of 21) who performed the first task were sampled
uniformly from the full set. In the control condition, the
workers for the subsequent two tasks were likewise uniformly
sampled from the full set. In the Boomerang condition, we
simulated the effects of the cascading task release by weighting
workers’ probability of being chosen for future tasks. Workers
with a high rating were given double the baseline probability
of being sampled, workers with a middle rating were left at
the default rate, and workers with a low rating were given half
the baseline probability of being sampled.
After completing the worker ratings, requesters concluded
by making a series of ten forced-choice decisions between
sets of three workers each. In each set, requesters answered
which of the three workers they felt was highest-quality. These
forced-choice decisions captured requesters’ private opinions
at a more fine-grained level, enabling us to compare their pri-
vate decisions to the ratings that they provided earlier. We
randomly sampled sets of three workers who had completed at
least one task for the requester. When making this final deci-
sion requesters could see all of the results that each worker had
been sampled to complete. It was important that requesters
not feel that their decisions here would impact their later ex-
perience, to ensure comparable decisions between conditions.
Thus, no Boomerang explanations appeared on these ratings.
In contrast, whenever a decision in the first phase carried a
Boomerang impact, this was clearly stated in the user interface.
We measured how closely requesters’ forced-choice decisions
matched their ratings. To do so, we used the X-, X, and X+
ratings to predict requesters’ ten forced-choice decisions. We
calculated a score, or the expected value of the number of
correct predictions. For example, if a requester had ranked
two workers as X and one asX+, we predicted that they would
choose the X+ worker. If correct, the number of expected cor-
rect answers rose by one. If there were ties, e.g. two workers
were rated X, the number of expected correct answers rose by
1
2 and
1
3 if a three-way tie. In other words, the score was the
expected value of the number of correct answers on the forced-
choice task using the ratings as the only source of information.
During analysis, we dropped participants who indicated low
attention by having three or more inconsistent decisions in
the forced-choice task (i.e. preferring one worker over another
in one round, then swapping the opinion in another round),
or as is common, were statistical outliers of at least three
standard deviations from the mean. We then performed an un-
paired t-test to compare the scores between the two conditions.
We hypothesized that requesters in the Boomerang condition
would have higher scores — in other words, ratings that were
more predictive of their forced-choice decisions.
Requesters: Results
Requesters in the control condition had an average score of
3.9 out of 10 (σ = .79), and requesters in the Boomerang
condition had an average score of 4.6 out of 10 (σ = .83). An
unpaired t-test confirmed that requesters in the Boomerang
condition scored significantly higher: t(33) = 2.66, p < .01,
Cohen’s d = 0.91. Thus, Boomerang had a large positive ef-
fect on the information contained in ratings . Moreover, the
rating distribution was sharply shifted: requesters in the con-
trol condition reported 15.2 X+ ratings out of 21 on average,
but in the Boomerang condition, this dropped by nearly half
to 8.7 X+ ratings on average. The Boomerang condition’s
de-inflated ratings shifted into X (7.6, vs. 3.1 in control),
and into X- (4.6, vs. 2.6 in control). Boomerang markedly
Figure 5. Requesters’ average scores in the Boomerang condition was
higher than the control condition, indicating that Boomerang was more
effective at producing informative ratings: t(33)=2.66, p<.01, Cohen’s
d= 0.91.
Figure 6. Boomerang markedly redistributed requesters’ ratings, as the
X+ rating was used more sparingly.
redistributed requesters’ ratings, as the X+ rating was used
sparingly, resulting in more informative reputation feedback.
Workers: Method
As with the requesters, we used a between-subjects study
to test the effectiveness of Boomerang’s feedback system in
incentivizing workers to provide more accurate ratings to re-
questers. We similarly predicted that Boomerang would yield
ratings closer to workers’ forced-choice decisions about re-
questers than a control rating interface.
The setup of this study mirrored that of the requester study.
We recruited 42 workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk who
had over 500 HITs completed and over a 95% acceptance rate.
The study lasted roughly an hour, so we paid workers $10 in
line with current ethical standards on Mechanical Turk [46].
We randomized the workers between Boomerang and control
conditions.
To create tasks for the workers to perform, we sampled over
fifty tasks from Mechanical Turk and recreated them exactly
on Daemo. We sampled these tasks to canvas a variety of high-,
medium-, and low-rated requesters based on their Turkopticon
ratings [24]. We then evenly distributed these fifty tasks among
seven requesters, so that each requester would have tasks of
matched quality.
Workers were told that they would be completing tasks in two
phases: the first would consist of a small number of tasks with
no time limit, and the second would consist of a 15-minute
time limit to complete the best tasks in a very large set of
tasks. Because workers did not have a long-term stake in their
experience on Daemo, we could not rely on long-term feed
curation as a motivator by itself: we thus used the looming
larger set of tasks to motivate workers to care about quickly
uncovering high-quality tasks. Workers then entered the first
phase to complete fourteen tasks, two per requester. They
rated each task as they proceeded.
In the control condition, the rating feedback was similar to
traditional reputation systems, with “I like this”, “Default”,
and “I don’t like this”. The feedback did not impact future
task feed ranking. In the treatment condition, the feedback
communicated the Boomerang mechanism: “I like this: fea-
ture this requester’s tasks at the top of my task feed in the
future”, “Same: keep this requester’s tasks in the middle of
my task feed” and “I don’t like this: bury this requester’s tasks
at the bottom of my task feed in the future”. Workers in the
treatment condition saw their task feed re-rank as they entered
this rating feedback.
After workers finished all fourteen tasks and provided ratings
for them, we introduced a series of private forced-choice de-
cisions between requesters. These forced-choice decisions
captured workers’ opinions at a more fine-grained level, en-
abling us to compare their private decisions to the ratings
that they provided previously. Each forced-choice decision
displayed three randomly selected requesters from the set of
seven, as well as the tasks that the worker had completed
for each of the three requesters. Workers were asked to se-
lect which of the three requesters they preferred. Workers’
previous rating feedback was hidden during this phase. As
before, no Boomerang-related information appeared in the
forced-choice comparisons, which were designed to commu-
nicate that workers’ opinions were private and had no impact
on later phases. We repeated this forced-choice ten times by
re-sampling sets of three requesters. Finally, when workers
arrived at the second phase of the task, we told them that they
had been selected to skip the second phase of the task and
would be paid in full. Workers believing that the second phase
of the task was coming was sufficient to set their motivation;
completing the second round of tasks was unnecessary once
they actually arrived.
Similar to the requester study, we measured how closely work-
ers’ forced-choice decisions matched their ratings. To do so,
we calculated an expected number of correct predictions given
the ratings from the first phase to predict the decisions in the
second phase. We filtered out outliers and inattentive partici-
pants using the same techniques as the requester study, then
used an unpaired t-test to compare the scores between workers
in the control and Boomerang conditions. We hypothesized
that workers in the Boomerang condition would have higher
scores — in other words, that Boomerang ratings would be
more predictive of workers’ forced-choice decisions.
Workers: results
Workers in the control condition had an average score of 4.5
out of 10 (σ = 1.3), and workers in the Boomerang condition
had an average score of 5.6 out of 10 (σ = 1.6). An unpaired t-
test confirmed that workers in the Boomerang condition scored
Figure 7. Workers’ average scores in Boomerang was higher than the
scores in the control condition, indicating that Boomerang was more ef-
fective at producing informative ratings: t(40)=2.87, p<.01, Cohen’s d=
0.89.
Figure 8. Boomerang had an effect of de-inflating the ratings that work-
ers gave, as the X+ rating was used more sparingly.
significantly higher: t(40) = 2.87, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 0.89.
Mirroring the result for requesters, Boomerang produced a
large positive effect on score. Again this outcome was a result
of a shifted rating distribution: workers in the control condition
reported 3.5 X+ ratings out of seven on average, but in the
Boomerang condition, this dropped by nearly 15% to 3.0 X+
ratings on average. To compensate, Boomerang condition
workers increased their number of X- ratings by 11% (average
1.8 vs. 2.0) and their number of Xratings by 19% (average
1.7 vs. 2.0). So, Boomerang had an effect of de-inflating the
ratings that workers gave, as the X+ rating was used more
sparingly.
Measurement validation
During the study, workers and requesters made private forced-
choice decisions that captured their detailed opinions, which
we used to compare the Boomerang and control ratings. In
this setup, it is important to verify that participants in the
Boomerang condition did not feel that their forced-choice
decisions would impact them later, or else the two conditions
might not be comparable. To check this assumption, we further
examined our data.
First, if Boomerang participants felt that their private forced-
choice decisions would impact their later experience, then
forced-choice decisions made in the control vs Boomerang
should differ even when faced with the exact same comparison
sets. We compared participants’ decisions when faced with
the same forced-choice decision (e.g., choosing between A, B,
C) in the control and Boomerang conditions. To reduce data
sparsity, we translated each 3-way choice into paired compar-
isons (choosing A over B and C implies A > B and A >C). For
each pair (A and B, A and C, B and C, etc.), we calculated the
percentage of participants who chose the more popular of each
pair, e.g., 81% Boomerang vs 71% control. If rating behavior
differed between conditions, we would expect Boomerang
decisions to more reliably identify the better requesters (thus,
have higher percentages), and control condition decisions to
be more random (lower percentages) because they have less
incentive to attend to the decision. We performed a paired
t-test between the two conditions with each pair forming an
observation. The t-test is not significant (t(14)=1.7, n.s.), sug-
gesting that the conditions did not rate differently on the same
decisions, and the two conditions are thus comparable.
We complemented this analysis with a second investigation: if
the two conditions produced different rating behavior in the
ground truth forced-choice evaluations, their decisions would
agree at different rates when benchmarked against a neutral
rater’s decisions for the same forced-choice options. We thus
performed the forced-choice decisions ourselves, blind to the
original decisions and condition. Two raters independently
coded answers for each forced-choice decision, with a third
rater resolving disagreements. Because these choices are sub-
jective, neither condition agrees completely with the neutral
ratings. However, they agree at roughly the same rate with
the neutral ratings (62% vs 65%), again suggesting no bias
in forced-choice behavior between conditions, and that these
decisions likely captured honest private opinions.
Study 2: Rejection rates
The first study demonstrated that Boomerang produces feed-
back that is more tightly aligned with workers’ and requesters’
opinions. In this study, we generalize the result by performing
a between-subjects experiment to measure the behavior shift
in response to Boomerang’s rejection visibility.
Requesters: Method
We began by obtaining results for requesters to review. We
used Amazon Mechanical Turk workers’ responses to 24 title
generation tasks [8] that asked workers to transform a series
of queries into a descriptive title that summarizes the queries.
Workers’ responses were hand-labeled as correct or incorrect
by two raters, and a third rater resolved any differences. We
use these hand-labeled decisions as ground truth, and mea-
sured whether requesters in the Boomerang condition were
more likely to produce the same decisions.
We recruited 12 requesters who had experience posting tasks
on Amazon Mechanical Turk and randomized them between
Boomerang and control groups. We provided each requester
with the instructions that workers received, as well as the re-
sults, and asked them to review the submissions to accept or
reject as they would on Mechanical Turk. Requesters in the
control condition made their decisions without additional in-
formation, as they would on traditional platforms. Requesters
in the Boomerang condition were shown instructions that ex-
plained to them how Boomerang’s rejection visibility worked,
including how low- and high-quality workers would see the
rejection information in their task feeds. Workers’ reputation
scores were not shown to requesters during this experiment.
We measured each requester’s accuracy as the number of ac-
cept or reject decisions they made that matched the ground-
truth decisions. We performed an unpaired t-test to compare
the accuracy of requesters in each condition. We hypothesized
that requesters in the Boomerang condition would have higher
accuracy than those in the control condition.
Requesters: Results
The hypothesis was supported: requesters in the Boomerang
condition were more accurate in matching the pre-labeled
correct/incorrect decisions in their acceptance and rejection
decisions. The mean accuracy in the Boomerang condition
(78%, σ = 6%) was higher than the mean accuracy in the
control condition (66%, σ = 11%). An unpaired t-test com-
paring the two conditions confirmed that the difference was
significant: t(10) = 2.235, p < 0.05, Cohen’s d = 1.29
Workers: Method
Finally, we sought to measure whether displaying rejection
rates in the task feed would cause workers to actually seek
out or avoid tasks, as requesters were led to believe. We
thus recruited 40 workers from Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Each worker was paid a base rate of $10. We asked work-
ers to complete tasks for fifteen minutes and make as much
money as possible on the platform. We offered to pay them
a bonus equal to their earnings on Daemo, provided that the
requesters for each task accepted their work. For this time
period, the task feed was populated with over fifty tasks used
in Study 1, grouped across fourteen requesters. We random-
ized each requester’s rejection rate into three buckets: low
(0-3%), medium (10-20%), and high (40-60%). These rejec-
tion buckets were empirically determined with feedback from
Mechanical Turk workers on forums. The result was a series of
tasks of varying quality (per the original Turkopticon ratings),
augmented with a randomized set of rejection rates.
We then measured the number of tasks completed in each
category (low, medium, high) by the workers. We performed
a chi-square test to compare the number of tasks completed in
each category.
Workers: Results
Workers were inclined to select tasks from requesters with low
rejection rates (i.e., 0%-3%). Out of all 180 tasks completed,
75% of the tasks done were of low rejection rate requesters.
The rest were from medium (11%) and high (14%) rejection
rate requesters. A chi-square test confirmed that this difference
was statistically significant, χ2(2) = 141.0, p < .001.
Summary
Study 1 showed that requesters’ and workers’ average ratings
in the Boomerang condition closely matched their private opin-
ions, resulting in more informative and less inflated reputation
ratings. Study 2 demonstrated that workers react to the vis-
ibility of rejection information by selecting the tasks from
requesters with a low rejection rate, and requesters become
more accurate at accepting and rejecting submissions when
they know this is the case.
DISCUSSION
In this section, we reflect on the methodological limitations of
our studies, as well as the broader design space of incentive-
compatible interaction design. Our studies suggest that setting
incentive compatibility as a design goal can translate to more
accurate information on socio-technical platforms.
Limitations
The incentives in our design assume that users remain in the
social system for long periods of time and thus have a stake in
making the social system useful. An ideal evaluation would
involve workers and requesters who hold such a stake, either
by manipulating Amazon Mechanical Turk (which remains
inaccessible), or recruiting long-term workers and requesters
onto the Daemo platform. Because Daemo is still nascent,
however, we opted for a field experiment on Daemo that used
workers and requesters from Mechanical Turk. This decision
does limit the external validity of the experiments. However,
because it minimized participants’ long-term motivations, it
is also biased toward a conservative estimate of the strength
of the effect. There are also possible novelty effects, which
will need to be teased out in future work via longitudinal
studies. Finally, while we tried to recruit a wide variety of
crowd workers and requesters and used real tasks from crowd
marketplaces, our results might not yet generalize to crowd
work at large.
Not every user will be incentivized to rate carefully with
Boomerang — it is not a forcing function, but a (strong) nudge
for the rational actor. One challenge is that requesters may
not have the time or inclination to rate potentially hundreds of
workers for each task. In the deployed version of Daemo, we
thus only require requesters to rate a small, randomly sampled
set of workers (5–10) for every task. The motivation is that
this stochastic rating, especially if it biases toward workers
with less coverage, generates good rating coverage for work-
ers: assuming a worker performs twenty different microtasks
(e.g., image labeling) a day, and requesters are on average
rating even 5% of their worker pool, each worker will still
receive at least five ratings in a typical work week. A second
challenge is that a requester who plans to have only one task
completed on the platform may see little value in rating when
the outcomes relate only to hypothetical future workers. In the
inverse situation, since the longevity of requesters is often vari-
able, workers may not see any incentive in providing ratings if
the requester will potentially never post work again. We aim
to clearly communicate how honest ratings will improve the
overall quality of task completion on the platform.
The design space of incentive-compatible interaction
What is the broader design space of incentive-compatible in-
teraction design and how do we operationalize it? Figure 9
represents our reflection to inform future designs.
First, scope indicates the number of people engaged: either an
individual (and the system), or an entire social system. With
Figure 9. The design space of incentive-compatible interaction design.
Blue cells represent areas explored by Boomerang.
an individual, for example with Gmail’s Priority Inbox, there
is no negotiation with other people — rating an email as im-
portant provides better filtering for you in the future. With
a social system, the interactions are directly engaging with
other individuals, as in crowdsourcing workers interacting
with requesters. We suggest that incentive-compatible interac-
tion design becomes more important in social environments,
because participants have multiple competing goals. Second,
time horizon specifies how quickly the user’s decision impacts
them. Boomerang is relatively long-term, since the impact
does not occur until the next time a requester posts a task.
The ESP Game, on the other hand, is immediate—guessing
incorrectly lowers both the user’s potential point total and
their partner’s. We hypothesize that the shorter term the im-
pact, the more effective the design. Finally, incentive specifies
that interventions can either reward honesty, as in badges or
additional features, or punish dishonesty, as in connecting dis-
honest users only with other dishonest users (shadowbanning).
Boomerang’s reputation system seeks to do both—honesty
makes good work more likely, whereas dishonesty makes
bad work more likely—but the rejection design mostly only
punishes dishonesty. As long as truth-telling behavior is a
dominant strategy (i.e. it produces better outcomes than any
other strategy), both approaches can work.
Implications for other socio-technical platforms
How might other social computing platforms apply incentive-
compatible interaction design? Much like Boomerang targets
reputation systems in a marketplace, other social platforms
could target feedback and reputation systems as well. For ex-
ample, Airbnb hosts’ ratings for guests could influence which
users later see the their home at the top of Airbnb’s search
results: a host who gives a guest with kids a high rating may
appear higher in the search rankings for future users traveling
with kids. A second, more general category includes incen-
tivizing pro-social behavior. For example, Uber could give
lower priority to riders who cancel often. Likewise, Waze
could reward users who give reports on app by granting them
early access to others’ new information.
With respect to crowdsourcing platforms in particular, we have
focused thus far on reputation systems (e.g. ratings, rejection).
However, incentive-compatible interaction design could be
applied to many other aspects of the platform. For example,
one of the main concerns workers have is whether a given
task will pay enough in practice to meet their minimum fair
wage [33]. A crucial piece of information required to identify
such tasks is an accurate estimate of the time required by
the worker to complete it. This information is not readily
Figure 10. By asking workers to measure and accurately self-report how
long tasks take them, Boomerang can estimate workers’ hourly wage for
other tasks on the platform.
measurable because workers have no incentive to report this
number after they complete a task, automatic logs are not
accurate [26, 11, 12], and requesters underestimate how long
a task will take [20].
An incentive-compatible interaction design might incentivize
a worker to share the accurate time. To prototype this, we
have added an optional timer to each task in Daemo, then ask
workers to edit its recorded time. In exchange, Daemo uses the
information to predict that worker’s hourly wage for all other
tasks on the platform (Figure 10). To do so, Daemo estimates
a multiplier of how much faster or slower than the average
each worker completes tasks. With this information, any task
on the platform with at least one worker self-reporting their
time can show an estimated time to all other workers. (All new
tasks on Daemo go through an initial “prototype” phase where
a small number of workers self-report completion time [16],
so in practice all tasks on the platform will appear with esti-
mated times.) Workers who report inaccurate times will see
inaccurate hourly wage estimations on their task feeds. There-
fore, if a worker consistently underestimates or overestimates
time spent on tasks, they will receive a task feed that displays
skewed estimates, rendering their task selection process more
problematic.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstrate that incentive-compatible inter-
action design encourages users of crowdsourcing platforms
to report private information more accurately. We introduce
Boomerang, an incentive-compatible interaction design for a
reputation system that aligns the incentives of workers and re-
questers in reputation ratings and task rejection. Boomerang’s
task feed uses ratings from both parties to determine which
workers will receive early access to the requester’s future
tasks, and which requester’s tasks will appear at the top of the
worker’s task feed. In our studies, we found that Boomerang’s
design led to more accurate reputation ratings for workers and
requesters, and to a task rejection pattern that more accurately
reflects the requesters’ opinions of workers’ submissions.
The features introduced by Boomerang and the behaviors that
these features are able to motivate both workers and requesters,
demonstrating that incentive-compatible interaction design
may help prevent crowdsourcing platforms from becoming
markets for lemons.
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